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ABSTRACT 
 
Hans C. Blomqvist (2002). Extending The Second Wing: The Outward Direct Investment of 
Singapore. University of Vaasa, Department of Economics Working Papers 3, 18 p. 
 
The outward FDI of Singapore have increased rapidly during the last few decades, a 
development that strongly contributes to deeper integration of the country‗s economy with 
that of other countries in the region. A good deal of investment is targeting other parts of the 
world as well, especially Western Europe and the United States. Among the reasons for the 
increasing FDI have been mentioned the small domestic markets, the high costs of labor and 
land the opportunities that are emerging in neighbouring countries. Moreover, it has been 
Government policy to promote building an ―external wing‖ for Singapore. In terms of equity 
capital this ―wing‖ now corresponds to about 12 percent of the domestic economy of 
Singapore. In this paper an attempt at explaining the determinants of Singapore‗s FDI using a 
systematic econometric approach was made. The results suggest that access to (more or less) 
protected markets does not seem to be important for Singapore investors. The labor costs 
seem to play some role, however, as can be expected, but membership in ASEAN does not, as 
such, encourage Singapore FDI. Much of the variation in FDI to different countries remains 
unexplained, however. Although one may speculate about the role of national security 
strategy as a reason for this, we do not really know to what extent this may be the case. 
Finally, because of statistical reasons, as well as due to a somewhat shaky theoretical 
framework, the results should be interpreted with great caution and are, at best, tentative. 
More research is certainly needed before more solid arguments can be presented.  
 
Key words: Singapore, foreign direct investment.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Anybody who discusses foreign direct investment (FDI) in the context of Singapore is 
probably inclined to think in terms of inward investment into the Republic. After all, 
Singapore is one of the leading recipients of FDI in Asia and is known to have been able to 
utilise multinational firms as an effective device for development. However, the country has 
become an increasingly important source of outward investment as well, a large part of which 
has been made in the Asia Pacific region. In fact, Singapore‗s outward FDI have not been 
much smaller than its inward FDI during recent years (UNCTAD 2001). This is another, and 
more deep-going form of regional integration than mere intra-regional trade.  
 
The reasons for Singapore‗s FDI are not difficult to envisage at a general level. The problem 
of a small domestic market, paired with rapidly changing comparative advantages, forces 
structural changes that can partly be taken care of by locating production in neighbouring 
countries. Investment in developed countries, in turn, may be related to technology transfer: 
Acquiring new technology may be facilitated by operating in already advanced countries (cf. 
Dunning, van Hoesel and Narula 1998). From the mid 1980s on the Government began to 
stress the need for companies to go regional (see, e.g., Sitathan 2002) and in the early 1990s 
the Singapore government embarked on an explicit strategy of developing an external 
economy, a ―second wing‖ in order to utilise opportunities in the region and to reduce the 
vulnerability of the economy. Considerable investment in the developed market economies 
has taken place as well.  
 
Despite the availability of a good statistical database very little has actually been written 
about Singapore‗s outward FDI. The objective of this paper is therefore twofold. First, the 
objective is to give a descriptive account of the FDI during the last couple of decades, which 
is the period covered by available data. Second, some tentative attempts at understanding the 
driving forces of the investment are undertaken, with the starting point in the theories of 
foreign investment. 
 
 
2.  STATISTICS ON SINGAPORE’S FDI 
 
Data on Singapore‗s FDI are available from 1976 in the Government publication Singapore's 
Investment Abroad  (Government of Singapore, various years). The statistics give data on 
several aspects of foreign investment such as geographical and industrial distribution, number 
of affiliates, domestic versus foreign-owned firms as investors, etc. However, due to the 
development of survey method and coverage the information available has become more 
complete but, at the same time not entirely comparable over the whole period. (Government 
of Singapore 1995: 13). 
 
The statistics presently distinguish between the following categories of FDI: 
 
D1 (Direct investment) = Paid-up shares in overseas subsidiaries and associates + net 
amount due from foreign branches; 
 
D2 (Direct equity investment) = D1 + attributable reserves of overseas subsidiaries 
and associates; 
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D3 (Total direct investment) = D2 + lending to overseas subsidiaries and associates 
(Govt of Singapore 1995:13). 
 
The figures up to 1990 cover only D1. From 1990 information on D3 (and D2) is available as 
well. The emphasis of the statistics is on FDI stock.  The relation between D1 and D3 was 
around 70 percent in the 70s but has subsequently declined and stabilised between 50 and 60 
percent (Govt of Singapore, various years). Financial institutions were covered by the survey 
for the first time in 1994, which partly explains the observed jump in FDI figures that year 
(see below).  
 
Compared to FDI statistics of other countries the quality of the Singapore figures is good. 
However, errors and omissions cannot be ruled out entirely and the available figures are not 
complete in some important respects (such as geographical distribution). In particular it may 
be noted that a sizeable part of the Singapore FDI are in overseas holding companies1, whose 
further activities remain largely unknown.  
                                                 
1 For example, in 1999 the financial sector represented about 57 percent of total FDI. We know that this sector 
consists ―mainly‖ of holding companies, but the exact share is not reported. 
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Figure 1. Singapore‘s FDI, 1981–1999 (equity investment, stock), million S$  
  
Note: Due to changes in firm and factual coverage there are discontinuities in 1990 and 1994.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. External equity investment as a percentage of domestic equity capital, various years 
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Note: Due to changes in firm and factual coverage there are discontinuities in 1990 and 1994.  
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3.  SINGAPORE’S OUTWARD FDI: AN OVERVIEW 
 
As shown in Figure 1, Singapore‘s outward FDI have grown at an impressive rate since he 
early 80s—even considering existing discontinuities in the data series2. The relative size of 
the ―second wing‖ can be approximated by relating the outward equity investment to the 
value of domestic equity capital in Singapore. The increase has been considerable over the 
years, as evident from Figure 2. However, due to changes in coverage of the FDI surveys the 
actual increase has been somewhat less impressive than suggested by the figure. During 
recent years, the relation has been around 12 percent. (The ratio of D3 to GDP in 1995 was 
38.1 percent.) Whether this is a satisfactory figure or not, given the strategic goal of the 
Government, mentioned above, is unclear and has not, to the best of my knowledge, been 
commented on.  
 
Table 1 illustrates the regional distribution the Republic‗s outward equity investment. While 
the Singapore FDI has always had, and still has, a strong Asian bias, this emphasis has been 
on the decrease over the years. About 60 percent of the country‗s FDI still goes to Asia, as 
compared to close to 80 percent twenty years ago. There has been a gradual structural change 
in this investment, however. Despite the fact that ASEAN has admitted more members over 
the years and now comprises all ten countries of Southeast Asia, its relative share has been on 
the decline trend wise, with the interesting exception of the early 90s, which saw an increase. 
The AFTA agreement, which was conceived in 1992, is a possible reason for this. Another 
factor is the SIJORI ―growth triangle‖3. Okposin (1999: 154) estimates the share of SIJORI in 
Singapore‘s FDI in ASEAN at more than 50 percent. The figure seems plausible but it is 
uncertain what the estimate is based on. The great advantage of SIJORI is the combination of 
cheap labor costs and closeness to the advanced urban services of Singapore (see, e.g., 
Pomfret 1996). The ascendance of ―other Asia‖ as a host for Singaporean FDI reflects, of 
course, the increasing importance of China, combined with economic weakness of Southeast 
Asia after the Asian crisis, and its is likely that the share of this category will continue to 
increase for some time.  
 
The developed economies of Europe and the United States are fairly important directions for 
Singapore FDI as well. In this case it is likely that access to technology and other know-how 
plays a role, not only production and market related advantages. Although the Singapore 
economy is usually regarded as very US oriented the share of Europe as a host for FDI is 
actually, and somewhat surprisingly, more prominent. The category of ―others‖ has mostly 
represented between 20 and 30 percent. This is a disparate group as tax havens, type Cayman 
Islands, are included here.  
                                                 
2 This notwithstanding, its relative importance in the region comprising South, East and Southeast Asia has 
declined (because of increasing investment from China (incl. Hong Kong) and Taiwan). In 1996, before the 
Asian crisis, Singapore's share of the outward FDI flow from this region was about 14 percent. in 2002 only 5 
percent. There are large year-to-year variations, though. 
3 SIJORI is a semi-formal subregional co-operation zone comprising Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor and 
the Indonesian Riau Province. The term, ―growth triangle‖ was first used by now Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong of Singapore in 1989 (ASEAN Secretariat 1997: 140)and has since been widely used to denote subregional 
co-operation zones in general.  
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Table 1.  Geographical distribution of Singapore‗s FDI (equity investment), 1981–1999, 
percentages 
 
 ASEAN Other Asia Europe USA Others 
1981 64,3 12,6 3,0 1,9 18,2 
1982 59,1 16,9 2,8 2,1 19,1 
1983 55,6 18,8 2,6 2,1 20,8 
1984 55,9 19,3 3,0 2,3 19,5 
1985 50,2 26,1 4,0 2,9 16,9 
1986 44,5 26,2 6,4 2,5 20,3 
1987 39,9 24,6 12,1 2,3 21,1 
1988 40,6 25,0 10,1 3,6 20,7 
1989 33,5 23,5 5,8 5,5 31,7 
1990 26,2 25,3 8,0 5,1 35,4 
1991 26,3 22,4 9,1 8,6 33,6 
1992 27,6 24,3 8,3 9,0 30,8 
1993 27,9 26,1 7,3 8,3 30,4 
1994 31,8 25,9 10,3 6,3 25,8 
1995 33,8 24,5 10,4 5,5 25,7 
1996 29,5 27,5 12,8 5,4 24,8 
1997 24,2 29,6 14,2 4,6 27,4 
1998 24,0 36,0 7,0 5,1 27,9 
1999 23,3 35,7 8,3 6,4 26,3 
 
 
Note: Due to changes in firm and factual coverage there are discontinuities in 1990 and 1994.  
 
  
In discussions of Singapore‘s FDI the fact that a big share of the country‘s firms are 
subsidiaries of overseas companies is sometimes mentioned as a factor that implicitly 
questions whether it is really justified to speak of Singapore‘s investment. The share of 
wholly or majority-owned foreign firms has varied somewhat over the years, declining from 
54 percent in 1990 to 44 percent of total value in 1998. A regular feature is that the number of 
foreign affiliates is larger for the wholly or majority-owned domestic firms but the average 
size of the investment is larger for the foreign firms (Government of Singapore 2001). To the 
extent FDI are determined by economic incentives, the question whether an investing firm is 
domestic or foreign should not really matter much, however.  
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4.  GOVERNMENT POLICY ON OUTWARD FDI 
 
The Singapore Government‘s policy on FDI is closely related to its relentless efforts to secure 
the international competitiveness of the island state. A crucial part of this work is about 
structural change and industrial upgrading, which, in turn, is a necessary part of successful 
economic development. When the relative factor endowments of Singapore change, its 
industrial structure has to change as well. The Government has recognized this pressure 
towards change and has not tried to keep down, e.g., wages in order to preserve 
competitiveness in labor-intense industries4. This implies that low-end industrial activities, in 
order to survive, have to move to locations with lower land and labor costs. Less developed 
neighboring countries with very different comparative advantages are then a solution. Less 
labor intensive functions—including general management—can be retained in Singapore. At 
the high end of manufacturing, technology transfer is important. Through FDI in advanced 
economies Singapore companies may facilitate acquiring of new technology.  
 
The Government‘s policy towards outward FDI has been geared to facilitating and pioneering 
establishment of foreign affiliates at both ends of the spectrum. The government-linked 
companies (GLCs) were not seldom used as spearheads in the process, paving the way for 
other companies. This activity has probably been of significance as a support for private 
projects, although it has not always been an unambiguous success (Sitathan 2002). The 
immediate neighbors as well as other Asian countries (especially China and India) have been 
emphasized as main target countries. The role of the Government and governmental 
organizations in changing the mindset of Singaporeans towards venturing overseas has also 
been important (Sitathan 2002). 
 
After the recession in the mid 1980s the Government began to pay explicit attention to 
outward FDI. In 1988 the International Direct Investment (IDI) programme was conceived. 
Incentives included an ―overseas tax incentive‖, allowing firms to cut their losses through tax 
write-offs, tax exemptions for foreign income repatriated to Singapore as well as feasibility 
grants for appointing consultants to evaluate FDI opportunities (Okposin 1999: 89).  
 
In 1993 a Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas was set up. Its work resulted in several 
suggestions aimed at facilitating venturing overseas for Singapore firms. Obstacles were 
identified and the merits of various incentives were studied, as well as the possible catalytic 
role of the Government (Tan 1995). 
 
According to Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, the key principles for Singapore‗s 
regionalization strategy are the following (Tan 1995): 
 
1) Investment should be spread out; 
 
2) Investment should build upon strength in the traditional areas; 
 
3) Investors should go into markets with a long-term view; 
 
                                                 
4 During times of recession the Government has often resorted to reducing indirect labour costs, however, as a 
stabilisation measure.  
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4) Singapore investment must benefit the host countries (e.g., in the form of training or 
technology transfer); 
 
5) Singapore companies must be good corporate citizens. 
 
 
More concretely, the regionalization effort of the Government included several different 
measures (Chia 1996, Tan 1995, Tan 1995/96: 11-18): 
 
• Taking the lead in venturing overseas. Many activities were in infrastructural 
development, for instance setting up industrial parks in China, India, Riau and 
Vietnam; 
• Forming business fora at the government (or regional or municipal) level; 
• Facilitating for local SMEs (for example, the Economic Development Board 
(EDB) set up an International Business Development Strategic Business Unit 
(SBU); GLCs and statutory boards may form partnerships and consortia, 
selling expertise, identifying business opportunities, providing access to 
government officials, etc.); 
• Collaboration with Western multinational companies (MNCs). (The latter 
become tenants in industrial parks, forming partnerships with Singapore 
companies, using Singapore as their regional headquarters); 
• Providing financial assistance and incentives, e.g., the Local Enterprise 
Finance (LEF) (Overseas) scheme5. There are also a number of fiscal 
incentives, such as tax exemption for up to 10 years. Capital losses from the 
sale of shares can be deducted from the investor's other income, double 
deduction of certain expenditures (feasibility studies, establishment of overseas 
office etc.) is allowed. Tax exemption is granted for gains from investment of 
shares, dividends from foreign investment and interest from convertible loan 
stock 
• Personal and family support related to, e.g., education of children and to 
reconciling problems of National Service and frequent overseas traveling. 
 
 
5.  EXPLAINING SINGAPORE’S FDI: EARLIER RESEARCH 
 
Research results on Singapore‗s outward FDI are surprisingly scarce, considering the fact that 
these are quite substantial. The statistical survey reports provide an excellent data base and 
overview of the facts as they stand, but do not really attempt to explain what has been going 
on, apart from some basic observations. Thus the small size of the Singapore economy which 
makes firms dependent on expanding to foreign markets if they want to grow has been 
mentioned. In that context the promising prospects of especially neighboring Asian markets 
has also been stressed. Additionally, investment is seen as a way of overcoming labor scarcity 
and the threat of protectionism. The need to relocate to lower-cost production sites (in terms 
of labor, land and raw materials) in order to maintain a competitive edge is mentioned as well 
(Govt of Singapore 1991, 1995, 1997). 
 
                                                 
5 The scheme was actually set up before the Committee, in 1992, but was reviewed as part of its work.  
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As to more analytical approaches, Aggarwal (1985) Lee (1991, 1994), Pang and Komaran 
(1985) and Lim and Teoh (1986) dealt with various aspects of Singapore‗s outward FDI. 
Although useful, all these are rather dated by now, however. This is also the case for two 
MBA theses by Komaran (1986) and Ee (1991), respectively.   
  
Somewhat newer contributions are Tan (1995) and Tan (1995/1996), who concentrate on the 
political economy and government strategy of FDI and Chia (1996) who deals with intra-
ASEAN FDI and emphasizing, by and large, the same basic factors driving the outward FDI 
that were mentioned already. Also the unilateral liberalization that took place in ASEAN after 
the mid 1980s was mentioned as a facilitating factor for regional FDI. Chia (2000) touches on 
Singapore FDI only in passing while mentioning the same type of factors again, but also the 
economic and political security aspect. The common trait of these studies is that they do not 
offer much formal empirical testing of the explanations suggested. Tan (1995), however, 
reports the results of a survey from 1991, made at the Nanyang Technical University, which 
provides primary information on why Singapore firms choose to globalize. Unfortunately the 
results turned out not to be that informative, probably because of the design of the 
questionnaire6. 
 
The most thorough recent analysis is Okposin (1999). His approach was to investigate 
individual firms with the aim of determining which ―push‖ and ―pull‖ factors influence their 
decision to invest abroad. Possible differences in that respect between domestic and foreign 
firms were also looked into. Unfortunately, the GLCs declined participating in the study. This 
is not without significance, since the GLC represent a big share (we do not know exactly how 
big) of domestic companies‘ FDI and may possibly have a broader strategy as to, e.g., ―the 
national interest‖ than private firms (cf. Chia 2000, Okposin 1999: 93, Tan 1995/96: 32). 
 
According to Okposin‘s results, the most prominent push factors were, in order of importance, 
labor shortage, high labor cost, high land and rental cost, the Government‗s industrial 
restructuring strategy and the limited domestic market. Government support was deemed the 
least important factor with a very low score. The leading pull factors, in turn, were: 
Availability of cheap labor, political stability, cheap land and raw material, large market and 
shared language, culture and religion7. It is interesting that factors like tax incentives and 
trade barriers and market protection—often regarded as crucial for FDI—were perceived as 
the least important factors. (Okposin 1999:125). When domestic and foreign firms are taken 
separately some differences can be noticed8, although the rank correlation between the 
importance of different factors for the two groups is fairly high.  
                                                 
6 According to the survey the reasons for globalising were: to expand operations, seek new opportunities, gain 
competitive advantage across frontiers, diversify, increase market share, support Singapore government policy, 
enjoy economies of scale, for survival purposes, to take advantage of tax incentives offered by the Singapore 
government, compensate for too much local competition (Tan 1995).  
7 The last factor suggests that the actors in both home and host country are likely to be ethnic Chinese.  
8 The biggest differences are found in the cases of ―shared language etc.‖ (more important for domestic 
companies) and ―good infrastructure‖ (more important for foreign companies) (Okposin 1999:137-38). In both 
cases the differences are easy to understand. 
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6.  DETERMINANTS OF SINGAPORE’S OUTWARD FDI: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The aim of this chapter is to determine factors at the macro level that can explain the FDI of 
Singapore to different host countries. (No attempt is made to explain the total volumes of 
FDI.) In spite of the fact that economists have been interested in foreign investment for 
several decades there is no universally accepted theory, however. Instead there are many 
different theories, dealing with different aspects of the investment problem. Most, but not all 
of them start out from the decision problem of a single firm. Should it produce at home and 
export its products, export its technology or go abroad itself? If it does decide to go abroad, 
what host country should it choose? As noted by Lizondo (1991), most of the theories have 
some empirical support but no single theory has been able to decisively refute its rivals. For 
surveys of the theories on FDI, see, e.g., Agarwal (1980), Blomström, Kokko and Zejan 
(2000), and Lizondo (1991).  
 
The difficulties of empirically assessing the determinants of FDI are well known, beginning 
from the unsettled field of theoretical explanations. The investments are influenced by factors 
in both home and host economies as well as by economic-political measures and purely 
political issues. The starting point for the present analysis was Dunning‘s so-called eclectic 
theory (see, e.g. Dunning 1988). This is because it embraces, more or less explicitly, many of 
the hypotheses on FDI central in several other theories and also because Dunning‘s model 
during recent years has been used extensively to the point of obtaining a position as ―standard 
procedure‖. 
 
According to the eclectic approach FDI are explained by a combination of three types of 
factors: ownership, internalization and location advantages. The ownership advantages are 
firm-specific advantages, such as technology, brand name, managerial or marketing know-
how, etc., determining a firm‘s competitive advantage over other companies. Internalization 
factors explain why a firm may be unwilling to license its technology. Such factors are, e.g., 
the risk of abuse by the licensee and the difficulties and cost for monitoring the license 
agreement. Location advantages, finally, makes it advantageous to use ownership and 
internalization advantages at a certain location, where they can be combined with local factors 
of production. Favorable factor prices, transport costs and the institutional and political 
environment are examples of such advantages. A FDI requires that all these three factors are 
present—otherwise it would be preferable either to produce at home and export the goods or 
to license the technology instead of venturing overseas.  
 
The operationalisation of Dunning‘s model is far from easy, however. One problem is that the 
model focuses on a firm, not on the FDI of a whole economy. Worse, however, is that the 
theoretical concepts used in the model do not have obvious empirical counterparts. One has to 
make do with a set of rather crude proxies, which makes interpretation of the results 
uncertain. The ―solution‖ of this problem here was to use a set of variables which have been 
used in several studies before, which a least gives some possibilities to compare the results 
with those of other authors. The choice of explanatory variables follows that of Dobson 
(1993) and Thompson and Poon (1998) to a great extent9.  
 
                                                 
9 Variables related to internalisation advantages are difficult to assign at the macro level and are not included 
here. Dobson (1993), studying Japanese FDI, used cumulative Japanese FDI to capture this aspect, arguing that 
earlier Japanese investments made it possible for new investors to take advantage of familiar suppliers etc. 
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The variables selected, and rationales for selecting them, were as follows: 
 
FDI = Foreign Direct Investment (D3) (stock); this is the dependent variable. 
 
MKT = Size of the host country market, measured by the gross domestic product of the host 
country. (Although this variable has no unambiguous justification in theory—except in a 
world with high trade barriers—is usually included, in one form or another, in empirical 
models of FDI, and is usually significant as well (Lizondo 1991). One tentative explanation is 
that an investor who wants to supply a whole region from a limited number of production 
units is likely to locate in the big countries first.) The coefficient should have a positive sign. 
 
MKTG = Growth of the market, measured by the growth rate of the GDP over the preceding 
ten years. The rationale is that a rapid growth of a market suggests that the competition for 
buyers is less intense than in a stagnating market. The expected sign of the coefficient is 
positive. 
 
MEXP/EXP = The ratio between manufactured exports10 and total exports. This is the proxy 
chosen for market-related ownership advantage, following Dobson (1993) and Thompson and 
Poon (1998). The argument is that the more advanced a country‗s export structure is (the 
higher the MEXP/EXP ratio) the more technically advanced would the local competition be 
and the less scope for ownership advantage for the investor would there be. The sign of the 
coefficient should be negative. 
 
MIMP/IMP = The ratio between manufactured imports and total imports. This is a proxy for 
import substitution, used originally by Urata (1991). The idea is that a low level of the 
measure indicates a protective trade regime which, in turn, should induce firms to invest and 
produce locally instead of exporting11. A negative coefficient should therefore be expected. 
 
LABCOST =  Labor cost per worker in manufacturing during five preceding years, or closest 
period available in the statistics). This variable is rather obvious, as low labor costs is 
routinely put forth as a reason for FDI. The sign should be negative. 
 
FREE = an index of ―economic freedom‖ was included, in order to capture the significance of 
strong institutional foundations12. The index goes from 1 to 5 with a lower value representing 
a higher degree of ―freedom‖. The figures provided by the Heritage Foundation (O‘Driscoll, 
Holmes and O‘Grady 2002) were used when available, otherwise transformed values from 
Gwartney et al. (1996) were used. (Chaining two indices should not matter much since the 
index basically provides a rank ordering.) The expected sign of the coefficient is negative.  
 
A dummy, ASEAN, was introduced to capture possible effects of the ASEAN integration 
schemes (see, e.g., ASEAN Secretariat 1997). 
 
                                                 
10 ―Manufactured‖ exports and imports refer to SITC groups 5–8. 
11 In the literature varying explanations for what should be expected from the sign has been expressed, often 
with unclear justifications, see Dobson (1993) and Thompson and Poon (1998). 
12 Factors included in the index are: Corruption, non-tariff trade barriers, fiscal burden of government, rule of 
law, regulatory burden, restrictions on banks, labour market regulations and black market activities  (O‘Driscoll, 
Holmes and O‘Grady 2002: ch. 5). 
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Furthermore, two dummies were used as shift variables as data from several years were used 
in the estimations. Basically these are intended to (roughly) correct for the different overall 
level of FDI in different years, including differences due to changing coverage.  
 
  
Table 2.  Regression results 
 
 Run I Run II 
Independent variable   
Constant –4.471 
(–0.623) 
-2.868 
(-0.531) 
MKT 0.147 
(0.762) 
 
MKTG 0.001 
(0.003) 
 
MEXP/EXP –0.144 
(–0.255) 
 
MIMP/IMP 3.432 
(2.670)** 
3.113 
(2.759)*** 
LABCOST –0.472 
(-1.938)* 
-0.367 
(-2.526)** 
FREE –0.999 
(–1.409) 
-0.876 
(-1.520) 
ASEAN –0.023 
(–0.038 
 
D1 –1.273 
(-2.094)* 
-1.246 
(-2.431)** 
D2 0.351 
(0.785 
0.365 
(0.876) 
R2 (adj.) 0.31 0.377 
F statistic 2.899** 5.591*** 
 
 
Note: t-values in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, 
respectively. 
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In order to overcome the problem with a small number of observations, data from 1990, 1995 
and 1999 were pooled13. It should be noted that Singapore‗s FDI are not reported separately 
for all countries but for a selection only, the ―most important‖ host countries. The sample is 
therefore not random, which is another cause for caution when the results are interpreted. The 
model was estimated in a log linear form as some preliminary experiments suggested 
problems with heteroskedasticity for a simple linear model. The independent variables were 
checked for intercorrelation but no problems could be detected there. 
 
The results of the regression runs are reported in Table 2. Run I denotes the results of the full 
model and Run II reports the results when obviously insignificant variables are left out.  
 
Because of circumstances explained above, any conclusions from the estimations must be 
drawn with great caution and are very tentative. All in all, the explanatory value of the model 
is modest although not extremely poor considering the cross-section type of data that were 
used. However, a large part of the FDI could not be explained with this type of model which 
may, for example, contribute to a general perception that economic and political security 
reasons play a role in Singapore‗s investment strategies (as carried out by GLCs and statutory 
boards) 14. It seems that the market size related variables are not of any significance in the 
case of Singapore, in opposite to what has been found in studies on many other countries. 
Ownership advantage, as measured here, does not play any role either. This could mean that 
the location advantages are the important ones for the Singapore investors. It may also be, 
however, that the crucial ownership advantage of Singapore firms is familiarity with Asian 
business culture(s) but such a variable would have been difficult to introduce here. It may be 
noted that the same variable behaved ambiguously also in Thompson and Poon (1998). 
 
Protectionist trade policy, as measure by MIMP/IMP is highly significant, but the sign of the 
coefficient is positive, not negative, as expected. This means that import-substituting policies 
do not seem to attract Singapore investors who apparently choose to go mainly for countries 
with relatively liberal trade policies. A conclusion may be that the investors are aiming more 
at the world markets than at the protected local markets. The institutional conditions, captured 
in FREE, seem to have the expected influence but the coefficient is not significant at 
conventional levels15. Labor costs (LABCOST) appear with the expected sign (negative). 
Finally, membership of ASEAN as such does not appear to be an important determinant of 
Singapore‘s FDI, although a large part of the FDI actually goes to these countries. Comparing 
Run I with Run II shows that leaving out clearly insignificant variables does not change the 
general picture. In fact, the estimated coefficients remained roughly unchanged. 
                                                 
13 A rather long interval between the years selected was preferred in order to have enough variability in the 
independent variables.  
14 This does not necessarily mean that profitability concerns are less important than otherwise but that the 
strategic horizon may be longer than for a private company. 
15 The level of significance is 17 percent in Run I and 14 percent in Run II.  
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7.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The outward FDI of Singapore have increased rapidly during the last few decades, a 
development that strongly contributes to a deeper integration of the country‗s economy with 
that of other countries in the region. A good deal of investment is targeting other parts of the 
world as well, especially Western Europe and the United States. Among the reasons for the 
increasing FDI have been mentioned the small domestic markets, the high cost of labor and 
land the opportunities that are emerging in neighboring countries. Moreover, it has been 
Government policy to promote building an ―external wing‖ for Singapore. In terms of equity 
capital this ―wing‖ now represents about 12 percent of the domestic economy of Singapore. In 
this paper an attempt at explaining the determinants of Singapore‘s FDI using a systematic 
econometric approach was also made. The results suggest that access to (more or less) 
protected markets does not seem to be important for Singapore investors. The labor costs 
seem to plays some role, however, as can be expected, but membership in ASEAN does not, 
as such, encourage Singapore FDI. Much of the variation in FDI to different countries 
remains unexplained, however. Although one may speculate about the role of national 
security strategy as a reason for this, we do not really know to what extent this may be the 
case. Finally, because of statistical reasons, as well as due to a somewhat shaky theoretical 
framework, the results should be interpreted with great caution and are, at best, tentative.  
More research is certainly needed before more solid arguments can be put forth. 
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